Many scholars have explored the "democratic advantage" in international relations: the empirical regularity that democracies tend to win militarized disputes, wars, and interstate rivalries. Schultz and Weingast (2003) argue that the democratic advantage originates from competitive representative institutions lowering the cost of borrowing. Building from the work of Broz (1998 Broz ( , 1999 , I argue that central banks, not representative institutions, are responsible for enhancing a country's financial health and, consequently, war fighting prowess. Because the exigencies of representative government do little to placate concerns over government default, only the presence of a central bank can ease creditor fears. Data covering the 19th and early 20th centuries reveals that possessing a central bank increases the probability of victory, improves the terms of credit for a sovereign, and enables the country to spend more on the military. This relationship holds whether the country does or does not possess representative institutions.
1 Reiter and Stam 2002 . Scholars have forwarded several mechanisms for why democratic leaders have a willingness and ability to select their conflicts. The need to garner widespread public support induces democratic regimes to avoid conflicts with little chance of success (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bueno de Mesquita et al 1999) . Additionally, a benign after-office fate means democratic leaders are willing to incur the political costs of offering concessions that avoid undesirable conflicts (Debs and Goemans 2010) .
2 For some, the legitimacy of democratic rule eases the government's ability to mobilize military resources and leads soldiers to fight with more vigor (Reiter and Stam 2002) . Others argue that democratic leaders -constrained by their societies from collecting large rents for holding office -devote greater resources to security than non-democracies (Lake 1992) . Still others propose that opposition party support, when it is granted, increases the credibility of threats from democracies (Schultz 2001) . 4 For instance, Schutlz and Weingast (1998) show that the British, with the Bank of England, enjoyed interest rates systematically lower than those of France (its major rival) over the course of the 1700s despite both states having similar levels of military and government spending (See figures 4 and 5 of Schultz and Weingast 1998) . Additionally, Murphy (1950) shows how despite issuing seven series of war bonds over a three year period, the United States government was able to keep interest rates steady, with a peak rate of just 2.5 percent (Murphy 1950, pp. 134, 139, 146 152) . This was due largely to the commitment on the part of the Federal Reserve bank to continue purchasing bonds no matter the number issued (Hertzel and Leach 2001, p. 33) .
5 There is a third, though less important, reason. By the end of World War I, the concept of sinking funds -creditors accept a lower rate on government debt in return for the pledge that the svings are set aside to honor principal payments at a later date -had fallen out of favor and practice within the two primary applicants of the tool, the United Kingdom and the United States (Sylla and Wilson, 1999) . For more on origin and operation of sinking funds, see also Cooper (1982) and Bordo and White (1991) .
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2 The Argument
Why are Central Banks Created?
Prior to the twentieth century, central banks were largely created for the purpose of enhancing the government's ability to secure loans to pay heightened military expenditures. As Broz states, "the main societal public good was fiscal in nature and involved improving government credit worthiness during wartime" (Broz 1998, p. 206) . When a government chartered a bank to serve as its exclusive fiscal agent, the bank supplied funds to the government, managed the national debt, and handled the government's accounts. In return for being the exclusive manager of the government's accounts (and receiving the associated rents), the bank was required to invest its assets in government bonds. This ensured the government an easy source of financing, but also placed the ultimate responsibility for honoring those debts in the hands of the chartered bank (Broz 1998, p. 242) .
For example, in the early 1690's the British government was a poor credit risk due to previous debt repudiations. Creditors were wary about loaning to the government when war with France required ever-higher government expenditures. In 1692, because a life annuity, paying 10 percent, brought in only £108,000 of an intended £1 million loan, the government raised the interest payment to 14 percent (Broz 1998, p. 244 and Clapham 1944, p. 15) . Despite this action, the offering still remained undersubscribed In a sense, the British government's difficulties illustrate the argument of Tomz (2007) that a reputation for default can harm an investor's ability to borrow (Tomz 2007, p. 223) .
The Bank of England was created to overcome the reluctance of investors to lend. Broz (1998) , drawing from Hicks (1969) and North and Weingast (1989) , argues that the Bank of England's charter granted the Bank a dominant position in managing government finances (Broz 1998) . When the government sought a new large loan, it invited subscribers to incorporate as the Bank of England and made the Bank responsible for handling government debt (North and Weingast 1989) . Moreover, the Bank could not lend the monarchy money without the explicit consent of Parliament.
6 By creating a bank where the funds would be based on the whole of national revenue (not just the government's willingness to raise money for a particular loan), "the government had thus created an additional, private constraint on its future behavior by making it difficult to utilize funds of a current loan if it failed to honor its previous obligations" (North and Weingast 1989, p. 821 . Emphasis added).
The Bank of England's dual roles of government debt manager and supporter of the domestic financial system were well recognized as directly enhancing Britain's military prowess.
In 1770, Fond Montyon, a senior civil servant in the French Finance Ministry, noted how the ease with which Britain could acquire finance through debt (as opposed to taxation), gave
England a large military advantage relative to France. This led Montyon to recommend that
France consider adopting the same institution: "Great Britain finances by taxation neither all nor part of the costs of war, it finances them by loans and increases the annual tax burden only by the amount necessary to face the interest and redemption of the loan. That is the regime that France must adopt" (Quoted in Sargent and Velde 1995, p. 489) .
The central bank facilitated creditors' ability to punish the government for defaulting on debt. It accomplished this by reducing collective action problems. In theory, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a government for default is a complete boycott by all lenders (Weingast 1997, p. 228) . But executing such a boycott is difficult. It can be costly to coordinate and, most importantly, the government can offer extraordinary terms to lenders willing to defect from the boycott. However, by granting a central bank exclusive right to issue government debt, it becomes illegal for any individual to provide a loan outside the purview of the bank. 7 As Weingast states, "By centralizing the loan decisions in a single 6 North and Weingast cite David Ogg, who explained "Thenceforth, the investor knew that, in lending money on a specified tax, he had parliamentary guarantee for the security of this investment, based not only on the particular fund, but on the whole of the national revenue" (David Ogg, England in the Reigns of James II and William III (Oxford, 1955) , p. 413., cited in footnote 39 of North and Weingast 1989) .
7 Moreover, as was the case with the Bank of England, parliament established a system of prioritized 7 intermediary rather than among a large, diffuse community of agents, the bank's charter allowed it to enforce a community credit boycott" (Weingast 1997, pp. 231 Luck can never be eliminated as an explanation (particularly in the case of the Bank of England), but it could not possibly explain the persistence globally of central banks after their creation. For Stasavage (2003) , representative institutions (such as legislatures) ensure loans and cross-default (Weingast 1997, p. 230) . This meant that if the government withheld payment to an old lender, it could not promise payment to a new lender and, if the government defaulted on one loan, it defaulted on all loans. 8 According to Broz and Grossman 2004, this helps to explain why a permanent contract between the Bank of Enland and the government was not established, as the process of charter renewal ensured that the arrangment between the government and bank could be adjusted based on future contingencies (p.58) 8 that governments allow central banks to remain as managers of debt and loan repayment.
As Stasavage (2003) points out, politicians can use the threat (either implicit or explicit) to revise a bureaucratic agency's statute as a means of influencing that agency's decisions. Such threats will be more menacing in political systems where power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual, such as a monarch or dictator. In contrast, if government creditors have political influence within a representative assembly, then they can block attempts to revise the agency's statute (Stasavage 2003, p. 19) . Even if creditors are not in power in the representative assembly, the potentially detrimental impact on the economy can make the assembly reluctant to eliminate the central bank (Stasavage 2003, p. 180 ).
There are reasons to doubt this argument. First, the only country in history to eliminate its central bank (not once, but twice) was one that, at the time, had the most representative institutions on earth -the United States' decision to eliminate the First Bank of the United States in 1811 and the Second Bank of the United States in 1832. In fact, this highlights how, even if a country possesses highly representative institutions, an individual leader can take unilateral action to eliminate the bank. Since the Second Bank of the United States was associated with his chief political rival, Henry Clay, US President Andrew Jackson vowed "The Bank is trying to kill me, but I will kill it" (quoted in Ferguson 1998, p. 373) .
Second, returning to the Bank of England, the British Parliament, in actuality, did not represent creditor interests. According to Carruthers (1996) , "the landed gentry and aristocracy, England's traditional ruling class, dominated Parliament until well into the nineteenth century but played only a minor role as government creditors. The merchants and financiers of London, who did not dominate Parliament, were the main source of money for government borrowing.
Furthermore, there was little sympathy within the landed interest for the monied interest, so one cannot assume that members of the former would 'represent' and protect the interests of the latter" (Carruthers 1996, p. 202) .
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Third, some scholars point to the December 1817 note to Karl von August Hardenberg by Nathan Roschild as possibly highlighting that Nathan preferred constitutional controls be placed on a government before investing (Dincecco 2011) . Nathan states how he recognizes that "the sanction of the Chamber to the national debt incurred by the Government affords a guarantee to the Public Creditor which could not be found in a Contract with any Sovereign uncontrolled in the exercise of the executive powers" (quoted in Ferguson 1996, pp. 123) .
However, it is unclear whether the need for representative institutions was a condition that Nathan Rothschild felt should be universally applied (which, given the investment habits of the Rothschilds, does not appear to the be the case) or whether such constitutional control was simply required in the case of Prussia so as to reassure the British investors with whom Nathan was coordinating this particular loan (Ferguson 1996, p. 124) . What is clear is that Nathan Rothschild preferred that his business "consists entirely in Government transactions & Bank operations", by which he meant central banks such as the Bank of England and Banque de France (Ferguson 1996, pp.2 and 369) .
Instead, Broz argues that the government and central bank become 'mutual hostages' (Broz 1998, p. 235) . The bank benefits from the rents afforded by the government sanctioned monopoly. The government benefits from the ability to acquire financing at favorable rates. and will allow the bank to persist for reasons analogous to the incentives laid out by Beno de Mesquita et al (2003) : the leader does not want to lose the revenue enhancing properties accorded by the central bank. Stated differently, the government does not want to 'kill the goose that lays the golden egg'. As Broz asserts, "as a consequence of the Bank's ability to enforce a credit boycott, the sanctity of government loan contracts improved markedly. And with creditors' rights more secure, the government was able to borrow to finance wars on a scale that the Stuarts could only dream of" (Broz 1998, p. 248) . Thus, autocrats can be 9 See also Broz 1998, p. 234. Though representative institutions are not theoretically required for a central bank to be credible, my empirical specifications will allow for this possibility. In other words, rather than rejecting this possibility outright, I will allow the data to speak for itself.
Empirical Implications
My argument suggests several testable hypothesis. First, since central banks enhance the ability of a government to acquire finance and, hence, bolster its military prowess, the presence of a central bank should increase the likelihood of a country winning a war:
Primary Hypothesis 1: A central bank will increase the probability of war victory.
Second, the positive relationship between a central bank and war victory should apply irrespective of whether the country possesses competitive representative institutions:
Primary Hypothesis 2: A central bank will increase the probability of war victory regardless of the presence or absence of representative institutions.
Notice that these are monadically-oriented hypotheses (as opposed to a dyadically-10 Autocracy for the three examples given in this paragraph is measured using the Polity variable from the Polity IV dataset. If the dates are based on the Political Competitiveness variable also found in the Polity IV dataset, France would remain autocratic until 1898, while Prussia would have become 'democratic' in 1878. To test the primary hypotheses, I use the country-war as the unit of analysis (e.g. United Kingdom during the Crimean War) and must operationalize when a state enters a war, when a state wins a war, when a state has a central bank, and when a state has competitive representative institutions. Each variable is coded using the value in the war's start year.
War Victory
My dependent variable is war victory, as identified by the Correlates of War (COW) project (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) .
11 COW defines war as "sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period" (COW Interstate Wars Codebook Version 4.0, p. 1). Because COW records the outcome of each war -which side won the war, whether the war ends in stalemate, or whether the outcome is unclear -this is used to code when a state won a war.
Presence of a Central Bank
To operationalize when a country possessed a central bank, I draw from a variety of sources to create an original dataset of central bank creation and presence. 12 I identified all central 11 There is disaggregate in the literature as to whether one should include draws in an analysis of war victory (Downes 2009; Reiter and Stam 2009) . Rather than taking a side on this debate, I re-ran the analysis by including draws and then using an ordered logit model. The results are substantively similar to those presented in the paper. They are available in the supplemental analysis packet.
12 The sources include Capie, Forrest; Goodhart, Charles, and Schnadt, Norbert. Broz (1998) Table 1 to create the binary variable Central Bank, which equals 1 if a country has a central bank in year t, zero otherwise.
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Competitive Representative Institutions
Coding the degree to which a country's representative institutions are competitive requires capturing specific institutional features of a country, not a general concept such as a country's level of 'democracy'. Several variables from the Polity IV dataset are viable candidates for capturing this concept (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2009 ).
13
First, the Executive Constraints variable codes the extent institutionalized constraints are placed on the decision making powers of chief executives. While such constraints can be legislatures, Executive Constraints also includes councils of nobles, powerful advisors to a 13 Alternatives to Polity IV exist, but these are of limited value for my purposes. The Henisz (2000) dataset uses a continuous 0 (least constrained) to 1 (most constrained) scale to measure the difficulty leaders face when altering policy. Unfortunately, this data does not capture the competitiveness of representation within the country. This limitation is noted by Tsebelis (2002) , who also notes that the Henisz dataset fails to account for the ideological distance of the different actors (which would indicate if different institutions truly are veto players. Tsebelis (2002) measures different domestic actors with respect to their policy positions, but only for advanced industrialized countries after 1945. monarch, the military in coup-prone polities, and/or a strong judiciary (Marshall, Jaggers, and Guff 2009, p. 24) . Hence, this variable does not capture the degree of representative competition within the legislative body, which is the theoretical concept of interest (nevertheless, the supplemental analysis packet presents results that use this variable).
Second, the Political Competition variable is composed of two measures of political competition: (1) the degree of institutionalization or regulation of political competition (i.e. the extent that there are binding rules on if, when, and how political preferences are organized and expressed) and (2) the extent of government restriction on political competition (i.e. the extent to which alternative preferences for policy formation and leadership roles can be pursued in the political arena). This variable captures the degree to which political participation is organized and institutionalized and the degree to which participation is free from government control.
14 Unfortunately, this variable, like the widely used polity variable, is an aggregation variable: it combines two separate variables in the Polity IV dataset,
Regulation of Participation and Political Competitiveness.
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The Regulation of Participation variable captures the extent to which there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. 16 Like Executive Constraints, this does not quite capture my concept of interest. In contrast, the Political
Competitiveness variable captures the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. This variable takes on a value of 0 to 5:
where 0 indicates no civil interaction within the polity; 1 indicates no significant oppositional 14 Political Competition is valued between 0 (low level of political competition) and 10 (high level of political competition) and some previous studies into the democratic advantage in war have made use of this variable (Goldsmith 2007) .
15 See Gleditsch and Ward (1997) and Treier and Jackman (2008) for problems with aggregating several individual indicators of a regime's institutional construction and behavior into a single measure.
16 According to the description in the Polity IV codebook, "One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity" (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2009, p. 25). activity is permitted; 2 indicates some organized, political competition occurs outside government, but the regime systematically and sharply imposes limits on substantial groups; 3 indicates that political factions regularly compete for political influence; 4 indicates movement towards fully competitive institutions; and 5 indicates relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete regularly for political influence at the national level (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2009, p. 27) . Given this coding, I use Political Competitiveness to empirically capture the degree of competitiveness within representative institutions.
In my dataset, 5 countries had a score of 0 in at least one year (representing 136 country-years), 18 countries had a score of 1 in at least one year (representing 626 countryyears), 19 countries had a score of 2 in at least one year (representing 551 country years), 38 countries had a score of 3 in at least one year (representing 1,397 country-years), 4 countries had a score of 4 in at least one year (representing 66 country-years), and 8 countries had a score of 5 in at least one year (representing 223 country-years). Since a score of 3 or higher indicates the actual existence of political competition and representation within the legislature, I create the binary variable Representative Institutions that equals 1 if Political Competitiveness takes on a value of 3 or higher, zero otherwise. at the 0.99 confidence level. This is consistent with primary hypothesis 1: having a central bank is associated with a higher rate of victory. The bottom row of Table 2 These cross tabs support both primary hypotheses (that central banks increase the probability of victory and that the increase will apply whether or not a country possesses competitive representative institutions), but they also suggest an interesting caveat. The presence of a central bank has its largest impact on the probability of victory when the country lacks competitive representative institutions (if a country lacks representative institutions, possessing a central bank increases the probability of victory by 38 percentage points (0.30 to 0.68), while a central bank increase the probability of victory by only 21 percentage points countries (0.50 to 0.68) if the country lacks representative institutions).
Overall, these results strongly suggest four key conclusions. First, consistent with the first primary hypothesis, central banks enhance the probability of war victory. Second, consistent with the second primary hypothesis, central banks increase the probability of war victory regardless of the presence or absence of central banks. Third, the 'democratic advantage' may, in fact, be a central bank advantage. Finally, these results suggest an interesting nuance to my argument: that central banks create the largest increase in the probability of victory in countries without competitive representative institutions. This might be due to democracy having some small independent effect (perhaps the selection effect highlighted by the previous literature). Since cross tabs fail to control for confounding factors and selection effects, I now turn to multivariate analysis.
Multivariate Analysis
When conducting multivariate analysis, I wish to capture whether and how representative institutions might modify the relationship between a central bank and war victory. Therefore, along with the control variables described below, I include the interaction between central banks and competitive representative institutions.
Control Variables
To conduct multivariate analysis, I must specify a set of control variables. To begin, I include a number of controls that are common to studies of war and conflict outcomes. First, I control for the size of the country using the natural log of its population.
18 This data is identified by the Correlates of War project (Singer, Small, and Stuckey 1972 both value regulation as a means of earning revenue to fund public goods" (Broz 1999, 238) . Alternatively, early versions of the Polity dataset (Polity I and II) record the structural centralization of political authority in the variable Centralization (Gurr 1990, p. 21) . A Centralization score of 1 indicates that the country is a unitary state in which no more than moderate decision-making authority is vested in local or regional governments. The United
Kingdom is a classic case of such a country, though the majority of states in the dataset (48) fall into this category. A score of 3 indicates that the country has a federal system in which local and/or regional governments have substantial decision-making authority. The
United States during the 19th century is a prime example of such a state. Eleven (11) countries, including Germany, fall into this category. A score of 2 suggests a mixture between centralization and a federal system, though only three (3) countries fall into this category.
Estimation Procedure
I use a probit model with robust standard errors. Additionally, since a leading explanation for the democratic advantage is a selection effect -democratic institutions induce leaders to choose only the easiest conflicts -I also estimate a model that accounts for selection into conflict.
23 I estimate a model with both a war outcome stage and a selection stage. Some scholars, estimate both models simultaneously (Reed 2000; Lemke and Reed 2001) . However, this procedure does not allow one to account for the rarity of war onset in my sample (King and Zeng 2001) . 24 Instead, I follow Huth (1996) by taking the predicted probabilities from the first stage logit model (war onset), transforming these into an inverse Mill's ratio, and then including these as a control in the second stage logit model (war outcome). Since the weakness of this particular two-stage procedure is that the outcome model is heteroskedastic (Reed 2000) , I follow the recommendation of Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum (2007) by using robust standard errors in the outcome model.
The outcome model uses a logit to regress the probability of military victory on Central Bank, Representative Institutions, the interaction between these two variables, and the control variables described above. The selection model uses a logit model to regress the probability of a country entering a conflict on a series of variables: the control variables used in the outcome model, the Representative Institutions variable, the COW indicator for whether or not the state is a a major power, and, using the Trade Agreement Database of Pahre (2008), a variable indicating when countries were members of trade agreements from 1816 to 1914. Including the major power and trade agreement variables is important for both substantive and technical reasons. Substantively, major powers are more likely to 23 Since Heckman (1979) identifies how selection bias is a form of omitted variable bias, one approach for handling selection effects is to include in the estimation model those variables that determine if a state is in a war. While the Representative Institutions variable and controlling for whether a state is a war initiator partially accomplish this end, these variables do not capture the many ways in which democratic institutions can influence the decision to enter a war.
24 Accounting for data availability, there are 90 wars in a sample with nearly 2,900 observations. become engaged in conflict (which has motivated the repeated use of 'politically relevant dyads' in many studies of war and conflict (Sartori 2003) . Since the selection model is testing for the entry into conflict, it uses the country-year as the unit of analysis, rather than the country-war.
Results
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results from the base model with no controls, column 2 of Table 3 reports the results with the inclusion of controls, and column 3 of Table 3 25 I use the creation of trade agreements because actual trade data is only available starting in 1880 and, even then, only for a limited number of countries (see Oneal and Russett 2005) .
26 I also estimated the model with all variables but the central bank variable (and the interaction term). These results are reported in the supplemental analysis packet.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
The interaction term complicates interpreting the coefficient value for Central Bank when a country has representative institutions (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). In addition, the non-linear structure of the logit function means one can not discern the marginal effect by simply adding together the coefficient on Central Bank and the coefficient on the interaction term. Instead, one must compute the change in the predicted probability of con- 
For example, a risk ratio of 1.24 suggests that having a central bank increases the probability of conflict victory by 24 percent. In contrast, a risk ratio of 0.9 suggests that having a central bank decreases the probability of conflict victory by 10 percent. Figure 1 presents two dots and two lines that visually depict the risk ratios for War Victory (as computed using the coefficients from the Base Model in Table 3 [
FIGURE 1 HERE]
Overall, the multivariate results confirm findings suggested by the cross tabulations:
(1) the presence of a central bank increases the probability of war victory, especially when the country lacks representative institutions, and (2) representative institutions absent a central bank do not enhance the probability of war victory. The null substantive effect of a central bank when a country has representative institutions is a bit unexpected, but it is critical to test my posited mechanism before using these findings to bury the democratic advantage. This will be accomplished by the next set of tests. at anytime, not just during an actual conflict. Second, financial market participants may most question the ability of a government to borrow during periods of peace. Indeed, as will be discussed below, governments tend to default on their debt after the conflict, not during.
Exploring the Mechanism
My dependent variable must measure a government's borrowing cost (or some indicator of credit availability). A common measure of a government's credit worthiness during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was the 'spread' (or difference) of the yield earned on a government's bonds and the yield on bonds issued by the United Kingdom (Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh 2006 and Dinecco 2009a) . 27 Computing the spread requires data on government bond yields. Though such data is widely available for the later half of the twentieth century, it is much more limited for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The Global Financial Database (GFD) provides government bond yield data covering this earlier time period for 36 countries. 28 I can now compute, for each country in each year, the difference between the average annual yield on that country's long-term government bonds and the average annual yield on British long term government bonds. I use long term government bonds (such as British Consuls), rather than municipal bonds or bonds for 27 Using the spread does not remove the UK from my sample as it will simply have a value of zero. 28 There also exists the Investors Monthly Manual (IMM), a record of The London Exchange, but IMM data only goes back to the 1870s. For work that makes use of the IMM data, see Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2002) Dincecco (2009a , 2009b , 2010a , 2010b , and 2011 ), Clemens and Williamson 2004 , and Mitchner and Weidenmier 2008 specific projects (such as railroad bonds). Overall, I have a continuous dependent variable ranging from -2.26 to 11.29, with a mean value of 3.40 and a standard deviation of 2.39. [
First Look at the Data
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29 The yields reported in Figure 2 is the median year value for each country. I use the median yearly yield rather than the median yield because the yield is a highly volatile and skewed time series. Using the average yearly spread produces similar coefficient estimates as using the median (but with with wider standard errors). These results are available in a supplemental appendix.
Multivariate Analysis
Verifying that it is the presence of a central bank, I use two indicators of financial market development: urbanization and adherence to the gold standard. With respect to urban population, there is a widely recognized relationship between urbanization rates and the development of financial markets (Kroos 1967) .
Recent work by Rousseau and Sylla (2005) and Bodenhorn and Cuberes (2010) [was] an urban development having its greatest impact on the commercial and industrial groups that were a small part of the population. A large majority of the country's population was engaged in agriculture... but the agricultural sector would only gradually come to be affected by the new financial system as it extended itself beyond cities and spread its influences beyond its urban roots" (Rousseau and Sylla 2000, p. 31) .
31 Dinnecco 2009a uses this variable to proxy for per-capita income growth, since scholars such as Hohenberg and Lees (1985) , Bairoch (1988) , and Acemogglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that there was a close relationship between urbanization rates and income growth. However, as explained below, I already capture a country's economic size using iron and steel production.
tion takes the log of the Correlates of War measure of a country's urban population divided by the Correlates of War measure of a country's total population.
With respect to the gold standard, Dinnecco (2009a), citing Bordo and Rockoff (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) , highlights how another indicator of financial development and integrity was adherence to the gold standard. As Bordo and Rockoff state, because adherence to the gold standard system signaled both financial rectitude and that the country would only run large fiscal deficits in well-understood emergencies, this "significantly lowered the cost of loans from metropolitan Europe" (Bordo and Rockoff 1996, 390) . Drawing from the Messiner (2005) coding of de facto and de jure convertibility into gold, the variable Gold Standard equals 1 if in year t country i was on a gold standard, zero otherwise.
Second, I include several indicators of economic size and performance. Dinecco (2009a) argues country size is important as it indicates if a tax base if adequate for the government to pay back debt. I control for the size of the country's economy using the Correlates of War estimate of iron and steel production in each country-year and each country's total population in each year. Iron and steel production can also account for different rates of technological innovation and adoption across countries (Dinecco 2009a, p. 45) . I use the natural log of both variables due to their high skewness. Because better economic performance can increases revenues, which can change incentives to go to war and take on new debts (and create central banks), I control for the year-to-year change in a country's iron and steel production. Since the openness of a country to the global economy can also impact economic performance (which will again impact revenues and alter decisions to take Third, I control for previous government defaults. Governments can resort to default 32 I use the creation of trade agreements because actual trade data is only available starting in 1880 and, even then, only for a limited number of countries (see Oneal and Russett 2005). in the face of a fiscal crisis. This is particularly salient given my focus on war finance. Dinnecco (2009a) highlights that many early modern executives resorted to default as a way to handle the large debts accumulated during war. The dummy variable Default is coded 1 in any year in which a country is in partial or full default on publicly held debts. I use the list of government defaults from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) to code this variable.
Fourth, I control internal disturbances that can destabilize the political regime, thereby influencing the risk of default. To capture the presence of an internal disturbance within a country, the variable Internal Disruption equals 1 when, according to the Polity IV dataset, a country experiences a collapse of central authority, brought about by civil war.
33
Fifth, I control for whether the country is currently involved in a conflict. The variable conflict period equals 1 in year t for country i if country i is engaged in a militarized dispute during year t. I code conflict by identifying when a country was involved in a militarized interstate dispute between 1816 and 1914. As discussed with the tests for hypothesis 1, A MID occurs when one state directs towards another state a threat to use force, a mobilization of forces, or active use of force against another state (Ghosen, Palmer, and Bremer 2004) .
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Sixth, I again control for the top tax rate charged on inherited wealth. 35 As mentioned above, Scheve and Stasavage (2012) identify how states altered the highest tax rate on inherited wealth to finance war mobilization. This provides a fiscal instrument that could substitute for the need to use or create the monetary instrument of a central bank.
Additionally, I include several 'fixed effect' controls. First, I include a variable recording 33 This is captured by the polity variable in the Polity IV dataset taking on a value of -77. 34 One may wonder if I should also account for the fact that the Rothschild Bank, according to Ferguson (1998) , dominated sovereign lending during the early part of the 19th century. As articulated by the German poet Heinrich Heine in 1841 "Money is the god of our time and Rothschild is his prophet" (Quoted in Ferguson 2009, p. 86) . The German Prince Pükler-Muskau claimed in 1828 that without Rothschild "no power in Europe today seems able to make war" (Ibid, p. 91). However, even a monopoly lender such as the Rothschilds should still rely on indicators of 'good financial housekeeping' such as central banks. In fact, this was a primary reason why the Rothschilds preferred to finance countries that possessed central banks (Ferguson 1998, p. 369 Additionally, its large civil war, the largest war involving a major power during this time [ (2001) and Goldsmith (2003 Goldsmith ( , 2007 . Though neither study is perfectly applicable here (Gartzke studies the determinants of post-1950 capital-to-labor defense ratios, while Goldsmith focuses on military expenditures as a percentage of GDP), both studies still provide insights into relevant control variables. First, I control for whether the country is a member of an alliance, as alliances could obviate the need to spend money on one's own military (see Morrow 1993) . I control for alliance membership using data from the Alliance Treaty Obligation and Provision dataset of Leeds et al (2002) . Second, I control for whether the country is in an interstate rivalry and whether the country is currently involved in a militarized interstate dispute, as either state of heightened security could influence the country's military spending allocations. I include these variables using the MID data described above and Thompson (2001)'s data on interstate rivalries. Third, using data from the Correlates of War (COW) project, I control for the size of a country by including iron and steel production and total population (Singer, Small, and Stuckey 1972) . 40 Countries with larger populations and more industrial capacity may simply spend more on the military, as they have more people and property to protect. Fourth, I follow the common practice in studies of military expenditure by including the lagged value of military expenditure as a independent variable (Goldsmith 40 Acquired using the EuGene software, Bennett & Stam 2007 , 2007 . Fifth, since being a major power means the state has more far-flung interest for which it must protect (and, hence, spend money on a military capable of protecting it), I control for whether or not the country is identified by COW as a major power. Sixth, I
again draw on the MID data to capture if the state is involved in a militarized conflict in a given year. Finally, as with the cost of borrowing models (Table 6) Table 6 as representing the percentage change in military expenditures when a particular institutional feature goes from being absent to being present. 
Conclusion
The "democratic advantage" is the empirical regularity that democracies tend to win militarized disputes, wars, and interstate rivalries. Schultz and Weingast (2003) argue that the democratic advantage originates from competitive representative institutions lowering the cost of borrowing. Building from the work of Broz (1998 Broz ( , 1999 empirical and theoretical claim that democracies are unlikely to fight one another. The pre-1914 time period has been especially troublesome for scholars of the democratic peace.
According to Faber and Gowa (1995) , there is no statistically significant relationship between democracy and war before 1914. This lack of evidence may well be explained by the role of central banks in war fighting. And while I test this argument on the 19th century and early 20th centuries, it has obvious implications for today. With concerns ranging from the United
States government failing to raise its debt ceiling (and the calls for the US President to take unilateral action) to the unwillingness of the Greek and Italian governments to impose the austerity measures needed to temper mounting debt loads, creditors have reasons to believe that representative government can ensure a government's willingness to honor debts.
Future research should conduct dyadic tests. Doing so may reveal a "Central Bank
Peace" that either complements, substitutes, or even explains the democratic peace (the empirical regularity that democratic regimes rarely fight one another) and liberal peace (the empirical regularity that trade lowers the probability of conflict). If a regularity between joint central bank possession and peaceful relations is found, it may also speak to recent work on how financial interests can prevent conflict (Gartzke 2007; Kirshner 2007; Dafoe 2011) . For instance, Kirshner argues that the financial community (from private investment firms to government central banks) opposes war because it creates macroeconomic instability.
This fear of macroeconomic instability leads the financial sector to pressure governments to pursue peaceful foreign relations. In contrast, Flandreau and Flores (2012) point out that international financial intermediaries, such as the Rothschilds, did not "dislike wars -they disliked only losers, or more precisely the risk of being found in loser's company" (Flandreau and Flores 2012: 235) . My argument, also in contrast to Kirshner, suggests that central banks and financial development leads to peace, not because financial interests are pacifists, but because they deter aggressors. 
